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| the_art_of_futuring [2019-02-23 09:47] – nik | the_art_of_futuring [2019-02-23 09:47] – nik |
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| Imagine a future where the most revolutionary changes in our world have not come from nanotech, genetic engineering, artificial intelligence or even space development–but from cognitive science and a deepening understanding of how humans function (or not) in groups. What would such a future look like? | Imagine a future where the most revolutionary changes in our world have not come from nanotech, genetic engineering, artificial intelligence or even space development–but from cognitive science and a deepening understanding of how humans function (or not) in groups. What would such a future look like? |
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| –Karl Schroeder in [[http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2011/08/rewilding-etiquette.html|Rewilding Etiquette]] | —Karl Schroeder in [[http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2011/08/rewilding-etiquette.html|Rewilding Etiquette]] |
| </blockquote> | </blockquote> |
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| Some have assumed that key to successfully dealing with uncertainty is to take a deep dive into the long-term future. Even when the difficulty of prediction is acknowledged, effort is still devoted to imagining alternative possible futures. This is the case of scenario planning, one of the most popular of such approaches. […] There is, in fact, a fundamental flaw in such approaches: it assumes that we can somehow successfully imagine the central aspects of the future. There is ample evidence, however, that this is not true. We do a terrible job imagining the future, sometimes with dreadful consequences, and scenario planning (developed commercially beginning forty years ago at Shell) hasn’t helped us much. | Some have assumed that key to successfully dealing with uncertainty is to take a deep dive into the long-term future. Even when the difficulty of prediction is acknowledged, effort is still devoted to imagining alternative possible futures. This is the case of scenario planning, one of the most popular of such approaches. […] There is, in fact, a fundamental flaw in such approaches: it assumes that we can somehow successfully imagine the central aspects of the future. There is ample evidence, however, that this is not true. We do a terrible job imagining the future, sometimes with dreadful consequences, and scenario planning (developed commercially beginning forty years ago at Shell) hasn’t helped us much. |
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| –Silberzahn & Jones | —Silberzahn & Jones |
| </blockquote> | </blockquote> |
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| <blockquote>How can you craft strategy in nonlinear environment? […] instead of putting effort into better prediction (no matter how modest), in many cases strategists must take the opposite approach and learn to focus their effort purely on a better understanding of the present. [By] mitigating the impact of surprises [and] anticipating the consequences of their own actions. | <blockquote>How can you craft strategy in nonlinear environment? […] instead of putting effort into better prediction (no matter how modest), in many cases strategists must take the opposite approach and learn to focus their effort purely on a better understanding of the present. [By] mitigating the impact of surprises [and] anticipating the consequences of their own actions. |
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| –Silberzahn & Jones | —Silberzahn & Jones |
| </blockquote> | </blockquote> |
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nik